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T H E  OR IG INS  O F  PR IVATE  OWNERSHIP  
O F  LAND  I N  EGYPT:  A  REAPPRAISAL 
In the historiography of Egypt it has long been accepted that private ownership 
of land was introduced in the nineteenth century.' This development in statute 
law has often been linked analytically to a process of "moderni~ation."~ Mod-
ernization theory posits a fundamental dichotomy between two ideal-type so- 
cieties, the traditional and modern, which implies an equally sharp discontinu- 
ity between historical eras: before and after the beginning of modernization. In 
this view, traditional societies lack the potential for generating significant social 
change from within. Change results rather from the expansion of communica- 
tions and diversification of technology worldwide from modem Europe and 
North America. In the process of modernization, traditional norms and struc- 
tures break down in the host societies, and new, rational values and institutions 
emerge in their place. The development of Egypt's new land regime is usually 
considered one such change. 
In most historical studies to date, the impact of Europe and/or the rise of 
powerful reformers influenced by European ideas have been seen as crucial to 
the beginnings of modernization in the Middle East. For Egypt, the two events 
most symbolic of this are the French occupation of 1798-1801and the reign of 
Muhammad Ali Pasha, 1805- 1 8 4 8 ,  the "founder of modem E g ~ p t . " ~  On closer 
examination of the sources, however, the evidence shows not historical discon- 
tinuity but its opposite; not the shattering and replacement of institutions but 
their dynamic evolution, due as much to indigenous forces as to outside influ- 
e n c e ~ . ~This calls for a reappraisal of socioeconomic change in Egypt, of its 
relationship to European influences, and of the significance to it of reform legis- 
lation. 
THE  TRANSFORMATION OF  PROPERTY RELATIONS 
Contrary to the received tradition in most history texts, the transformation of 
property relations in Egypt and other Ottoman lands was already underway, 
and had led to the appearance of forms of private ownership of land, long be- 
fore the famous reforms of the nineteenth century. This becomes evident upon 
examination of the behavior of landholding elements in the eighteenth and nine- 
teenth centuries, of their struggles to acquire or maintain control of the land at 
three levels: as a source of revenue, as a disposable source of income, and as a 
means of production and subsistence. 
@ 1980 Cumbridge University Prr 7s oozo-7438/8o/ojo2~j-~r$02.50 
246 Kennrth M .  Clrno 
As these different levels of utility of the land indicate, a hierarchy of shared 
rights or claims to it and/or its produce existed in the period before Muhammad 
Ali's rise to power, similar to other precapitalist orders in Europe and Asia.5 
Political, economic, and social relations were intimately connected with prop- 
erty relations. Or to put it another way, property relations were social relations 
in the broadest sense of the term, sanctified in law. 
The establishment of private ownership of land in place of this system was 
not the creation of "rights" where none existed before, nor simply a matter of 
their transfer from the state to individuals. Rather it involved the consolidation 
of these shared claims into one sphere and their appropriation by individuals. It 
represents the establishment of exclusive control of the land by individuals as 
the prevailing system of property relations in place of shared control. 
Ottoman administration of land tenure in Egypt embodied the principle of 
shared right^.^ The sultan (i.e., the state) was by law "owner" of most agricul- 
tural land. State authority over the land was in fact limited to taxation and en- 
forced maintenance of the irrigation works through use of the corvee. Second, 
to carry out taxation and administration in the countryside, the state had turned 
to a variety of intermediaries who were made responsible for one or more vil- 
lages, and who received a portion of the revenues from them and from privately 
held sections of land in them in return for their services. Finally, peasants held 
traditional rights to till the land and remain on it. 
In Lower Egypt and parts of Middle Egypt peasants held their land sections 
for life, and passed them on to their heirs, as long as taxes were paid (hence the 
term uthur or uthariyya, loosely: "that which remains"). The annual Nile flood 
caused more extreme variations in the area of cultivable land in Upper Egypt 
and the remainder of Middle Egypt, and so land here was annually surveyed 
and redivided within the village community (ard mis iha,  "survey land"). Thus 
individual security of tenure was guaranteed the holder of athar land, and vil- 
lage clans must have maintained a similar continuous claim to their due portion 
of missha land. Neither the state nor intermediaries interfered in the production 
process except indirectly, through tax demands and irrigation works. 
J. C. Scott has noted that peasants value greatest and defend most tena- 
ciously these two conditions: security of tenure and control of decisionmaking 
in the production process. The peasant community's direct control of land and 
production is its means of maintaining security in face of unpredictable forces 
-such as weather, or a market economy - and of guaranteeing to itself a cul- 
turally defined, minimum, acceptable subsistence. Interference with these tra- 
ditional rights, or rigid taxirent demands which threaten to push peasants below 
the acceptable subsistence level, are more resented and more likely resisted 
than systems of exploitation which are more flexible but which siphon off a 
greater amount Ottoman law, significantly, provided of their s ~ r p l u s . ~  for 
lowered taxes in years of drought or disastrous floods, and also guaranteed the 
terms of traditional peasant t e n ~ r e . ~  
Ottoman regulations likewise provided for checks on the intermediaries, to 
prevent them from tyrannizing the peasantry, from usurping state prerogatives 
in control of the land, and from pocketing more than their legal share of reve- 
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nues. Salaried officials were originally employed to oversee cultivation and the 
collection of taxes. During the seventeenth century tax farms, iltizums, ap- 
~ e a r e d . ~They were acquired for a year or more through an auction held by the 
Treasury. With the iltiziim, its holder, the multuzim, received a tax-free section 
of land, isyu,  which he had cultivated for his own profit by wage or corvee 
labor, or which he rented out. His personal profit,fifh-'id, from usya land and 
excess taxes collected could come to four or five times the taxes remitted, indi- 
cating the profitability of iltiziims.I0 
Law must be backed by force to be effective, however, and in a situation 
such as this where the state is weak, its formal regulations provide little indica- 
tion of actual practices. Each party to the shared rights to the land of Ottoman 
Egypt, as elsewhere, could assert or defend them only according to its com- 
mand of means of coercion - its political power. As Ottoman authority in the 
provinces weakened, its land laws became increasingly irrelevant, while inter- 
mediaries gained increasing control of the land at the state's expense. By the 
early eighteenth century they had acquired landholding rights in Egypt that es- 
tablished them as landlords in every sense of the term. These included: (1 )  life-
time possession of the iltiziim, as long as taxes were paid; (2) inheritance of it 
by descendants, wives, or white slaves; (3) the ability to convert land into 
waqf, thereby guaranteeing the family's continued possession of it; (4) the abil- 
ity to mortage the land, (5) to pawn it, or (6) to sell it outright." 
These criteria are precisely those used in previous studies of nineteenth-cen- 
tury Egypt to show a movement toward private ownership.12 Paradigms that 
see private ownership as appearing in Egypt during the nineteenth century at 
the earliest should thus be discarded. 
The intermediaries' usurpation of state authority over the land was marked 
by a proliferation of legal fictions used to get around the formal, legally inalien- 
able status of the land. Mortgage and pawning were conducted under the eu- 
phemism of "transfer," isqut; sales were called "indefinite transfer," isqit  ila 
ul-ubud. l3 Similar fictions were employed in transactions involving waqf land.I4 
The resort to legal fictions should not be surprising since they were used in vari- 
ous times and places, for example, to circumvent Qur'iinic prohibitions of risk- 
taking and interest,I5 and were also used to circumvent restrictions on land- 
ownership in parts of contemporary Europe.16 Developments that caused land 
to be treated as an alienable commodity led to the use of these fictions, but the 
continuation of old legal terminology for land tenure on the surface has ob- 
scured this transformation. 
The reestablishment of a strong state in nineteenth-century Egypt arrested 
the development toward private ownership in part. Yet, paradoxically, it facili- 
tated this movement over the long term. The state concentrated control of the 
land as never before in a single sphere, in its own hands. Second, it violated the 
traditional terms of peasant tenure by interfering in production and transferring 
tenures as it saw fit. Finally, the weakening of the state after 1840 allowed a 
new generation of intermediaries and privileged landholders it had created to 
influence land tenure policies to their own benefit. 
If land tenure issues can be appreciated in terms of competition or struggle 
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among various actors over the land and its product, then developments in the 
nineteenth century appear as but a continuation of trends in the eighteenth cen- 
tury. The legislation of private ownership of land came toward the end of this 
long-term struggle for control of the land. It legitimized the new order this 
struggle had wrought, firmly establishing the positions of those who had gained 
in the process: the large landowners in particular, but also a stratum of wealthy 
peasants. Finally, it represents a late stage in the transition from shared to ex- 
clusive rights to the land. 
The circumstances that led to this transformation will require extensive in- 
vestigation in the future. Here is presented evidence that this process was, in 
fact, in train, as  well as the factors that appear to have influenced it and its out- 
come. Local and regional economic trends are considered, as well as changes 
in the nature of the state and its ability to regulate land tenure. The changing 
relationships among peasants, intermediaries/landlords, and the state, and be- 
tween them and the land are also followed. 
The lands of the eastern Mediterranean under Ottoman rule, while separated 
politically and culturally from Europe, appear to have been linked to it as part 
of a larger region subject to similar broad economic and demographic trends. 
The Ottoman Empire felt the effects of the sixteenth-century "price revolu- 
tion" and experienced a rise in population then at approximately the same time 
as did Europe. Population in Europe, at least, began to increase again in the 
eighteenth century.I7 This and the beginnings of industrial revolution led to a 
nearly century-long rise in the absolute price of agricultural commodities which 
is visible in both Europe and the Middle East. The price of land increased in 
turn, and speculative trading in it - even where legally prohibited -appeared in 
both regions.18 New elements shouldered their way in among the landholding 
classes, and local landholding and/or commercial aristocracies often were able 
to increase their political strength vis-a-vis their monarch and peasantry. 
The changing composition of landowning classes is marked in Europe by 
commoners acquiring noble estates - sometimes openly - even where it was 
prohibited by law, and in the Ottoman Empire by the entry of merchants into 
landholding.l9 Landed aristocracies (or their equivalents) were enticed by ris- 
ing prices and enabled by weakened state authority to increase their control 
over their holdings. The established sociopolitical orders, connected closely 
with property relations, were being undermined, and at the same time state au- 
thority over land tenure was being whittled away. Both developments laid the 
bases for institutional change at a later date. 
In the sixteenth century, rising prices in the Mediterranean region had led to 
increased exports of foodstuffs and raw materials from the Ottoman Empire. 
Venetian ships loaded grain in Egypt's ports at midcentury. Thereafter the Em- 
pire's population seems to have caught up with production, and the export of 
grain to the West was prohibited. The Greek archipelago then became a center 
for contraband grain trade which flourished in the eighteenth century.20 Egyp- 
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tian wheat, rice, and beans found their way to the West according to shifting 
market demand and the relative ability of the Porte to enforce its trade regula- 
tions. 
Industrial crops - wool, silk, cotton, flax, leather, oils, and dyestuffs - ac-
quired a new importance in the eighteenth century owing to Europe's industrial 
e x p a n s i ~ n . ~ ~In addition, both regional and European demand for the Levant's 
fine cottons and silks, and for its spun cotton and wool, led to increased textile 
production in certain areas. All of this resulted in expanded cash crop produc- 
tion, especially in cotton, producing yet another effect: a trend toward greater 
regional specialization. The planting of mulberry trees in the Lebanon and Ma- 
cedonia and expansion of cotton cultivation in Macedonia, Anatolia, and Pales- 
tine were accompanied by the development of food and vegetable dye produc- 
tion in other areas. The Biqa' and Hawran became important grain-producing 
regions fought over by the amirs of the Lebanon and the walls of Sidon and 
Damascus. Egyptian foodstuffs supplied Syria, Macedonia, and Istanbul, as 
well as being marketed in Egypt and the West. Egypt also produced indigo and 
safflower dyes for internal and export markets. Crop specialization in Egypt is 
somewhat problematic, as more than one crop per year could be raised in many 
areas. Different districts did tend to specialize, however, in cotton, flax, dye- 
stuffs, oilseeds, sugar cane, or food crops.22 
While only a small part of Egypt's external trade was conducted directly with 
the West, price movements in Cairo during this century clearly show that the 
country was feeling the effects of the overall increase in trade and the rise in 
agricultural commodity prices, suggesting that the factors behind the price rise 
may have been generalized, and not simply a matter of Europe's influence. The 
price of beans, wheat, rice, cattle, and camels rose two and a half times during 
the century. Mutton increased three times. Butter, oils, cheese, sugar, and 
honey rose twofold. Industrial commodities also show price increases: the 
price of raw cotton increased nearly fivefold, while the price of flax and spun 
cotton doubled.23 The export price of safflower dye increased nearly three- 
fold.24 In Egypt as elsewhere, rising prices enhanced the value placed on land, a 
major factor in its transformation into private property. 
In the sixteenth century the Ottomans had begun to convert Balkan and Ana- 
tolian timar lands into iltizams which court circles and urban "commercial- 
usury capital" acquired. At the same time these elements began to illegally pur- 
chase timars. Weakening state control and economic opportunities also led 
those timtirl~s who could, to convert their holdings, illegally, into iltizams. The 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw the appearance of life-term tax 
farms, mulikines, following the development of a speculative market in land- 
holdings. These centuries also saw the appearance of the Balkan c$tliks, pri-
vately owned commercial estates devoid of any obligations to the state. The ~ i f t -  
lik holder owned the land outright, and often the tools, animals, and seeds his 
tenants Here, the process of usurpation of state control was complete, 
and the terms of peasant tenure had also been altered. Ciftliks spread rapidly 
throughout the Balkans in the late eighteenth century, associated closely with 
"the diffusion of the cultivation of new colonial products: cotton and maize."26 
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The production and trade of such cash crops were the economic basis of the 
rise of powerful provincial notables, the ~ ' y a n . ~ ~  
In the Lebanon, the expansion of sericulture was organized by Maronite and 
Druze shaykhs and the Maronite monastic orders. As in the Balkans, the con- 
centration of land in fewer hands and the increased exploitation of tenants are 
associated with the spread of market-oriented agriculture. In both regions the 
conversion of holdings into waqf - property set aside for the ostensible support 
of pious works -played an important role in the alienation and concentration of 
land.28 
The rise of Shaykh Ziihir al-'Umar in Palestine is associated with the spread 
of cotton cultivation. As multazims, Ziihir and other shaykhs were able to mo- 
nopolize cotton by serving as middlemen between peasants and French mer- 
chants. His successor as local strongman, the Wali of Sidon Ahmad Pasha al- 
Jazziir, sought to acquire as much land as possible in the form of malikhne. His 
monopolization of all production and trade anticipates the methods of Muham- 
mad Ali.29 
Ottoman officials were aware of the fiscal and political dangers of develop- 
ments in landholding, though not always able to stop them. Attempts to reform 
the land regime which appear "modern" in inspiration were actually efforts to 
reestablish a greater degree of state control over the land. In the seventeenth 
century, reform-minded Ottomans criticized the malikhne system, and it was 
decreed abolished under Ahmad I11 in 1 7 1 4 / 1 7 1 5 . ~ ~Military reverses weakened 
his position and led to the decree's reversal three years later. He later at- 
tempted yet another reform, turning malikhne lands back into short-term 
iltiziims and placing some under the administration of salaried state officials. 
Also, "for the first time in over a century extensive cadastral surveys were 
made. . . ."31 
Efforts to curb the power of local notables and reestablish state control over 
the land were revived under Sultans Mustafa 111 and Abdulhamid I.32 Adminis- 
trative and military reforms were always accompanied by fiscal reforms af- 
fecting landholding: the well-known reforms of Selim I11 and Mahmud I1 fol- 
lowed this pattern. To study Ottoman landholding in this period is to study a 
multifaceted struggle for the land itself, both between the political center and 
the provinces, and among the actors in each locale. 
T H E  SITUATION IN EGYPT 
While the agrarian history of Egypt in this period has yet to receive detailed 
examination, it is possible to reconstruct a partial picture of it from the evi- 
dence already available. The two, more-or-less constant political-economic 
factors favoring change in late Ottoman Egypt were the secular rise in agricul- 
tural prices and the weakness of state authority. But if conditions favor change, 
it is still human action and interaction which determines its course and out- 
come. 
Under the conditions of the eighteenth century, intermediaries and peasants 
responded in a variety of ways affecting landholding and land use. Parallel to 
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changes elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire, multazims in Egypt succeeded in 
transforming their iltiziims into a form of private property in land. Early in the 
eighteenth century, their new rights of disposition were expressed in the term 
"malikine," indicating that lifetime tenure had become common. Conversion 
of the land into waqf, and bequest, mortgage, pawning, or sale of it - through 
the device of isqiit - were within the multazim's power. The earliest register 
devoted to isqiit in Egypt dates from 1728, indicating that by this time this legal 
fiction was commonly used in transactions involving landholding^.^^ 
Cairo's merchants appear among the holders and purchasers of iltiziims in 
these registers, and speculative transactions appear to have often occurred 
within an absentee landholding class there. A merchant appears in court rec- 
ords as a holder of three villages in Daqahliyya province as early as 1 6 7 3 , ~ ~  and
the Sharii'ibi merchant dynasty in particular increased their landholdings 
throughout the eighteenth century .35 T .  Walz's study of the gullabu merchants, 
those engaged in the Sudan trade, shows that some lesser merchants also ac- 
quired iltiziims. Others rented sections of iltiziim or waqf lands, or held mort- 
gages of fallah land.36 Egypt's wealthier ulama were also active in acquiring 
iltiziims, primarily in their home districts, in addition to their administration of 
waqf lands.37 
The wealthy merchants' involvement in land was part of a general trend of 
investment in urban and rural properties and tax farms.38 The wealthiest ulama 
are hardly distinguishable from the large merchants in these financial deal- 
i n g ~ . ~ ~Such investments made sense. The relative stagnation of coffee and tex- 
tile prices undermined the most profitable commerce in the hands of indigenous 
merchants,40 while agricultural commodity prices rose. It is presently impossi- 
ble to ascertain the extent of merchant involvement in landholding. A. A. Abd 
al-Rahim's figures show merchants comprising only slightly more than one per- 
cent of the total number of multazims on the eve of the French invasion, as 
opposed to none a century and a half earlier.41 But the size of their holdings is 
unfortunately not indicated, nor is the number and extent of the mortgages that 
they undoubtedly held. 
The evidence is also inconclusive concerning the accumulation of iltiziims. 
Many holdings appear to have been small and scattered: between 1658- 1660 
and 1797 the total number of multazims increased by more than 250 percent, 
although the extent of fractionalization of their holdings varied from one area to 
the next.42 On the other hand, some multazims were converting fallah land into 
usya land,43 a process reminiscent of the engrossment of demesne holdings in 
contemporary eastern Europe, under similar conditions. 
The conversion of holdings into waqf is another example of the growth of de 
facto private property in land through the use of legal fictions. Waqf lands paid 
only a "protection tax" in this period to safeguard their status. Legally, they 
could not be divided or sold, nor were they commonly subject to confiscation. 
"Family," or uhli, waqfs, furthermore, remained in the possession of the 
makers' descendants. They received the bequest's income until the extinction 
of the line, and only then did the revenues from an ahli waqf revert to the desig- 
nated charitable work. Thus conversion of land into ahli waqf guaranteed the 
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family's continued possession of it, along with important tax exemptions, and 
many multazims were able to convert their iisya holdings into waqf. Here, too, 
the growth of a market in land resulted in the exchange of waqf lands - despite 
the law -by what amounted to sale. Waqf lands were exploited in a way similar 
to iisya lands: the nazir, administrator, either leased them to a village shaykh or 
had them cultivated by means of wage labor.44 
Jabarti reports that waqf lands surveyed in 1813 came to 600,ooo faddans in 
Upper Egypt and the Cairo vicinity. Thus the amount of land converted to waqf 
in these areas alone came to some 20 percent of all of Egypt's cultivated land,45 
a measure of the extent to which land was taken out of the state's control in this 
period. If Jabarti's remarks are any guide, the concentration of waqf lands in 
the hands of wealthy nizirs and notables was indeed common. He mentions 
one Shams al-Din b. Hamuda, a shaykh of the village of Birmii, Minufiyya, who 
told him that his family held I ,000 faddans of waqf land for which no tax was 
paid, in addition to other lands for which he paid a nominal amount.46 
Despite the consolidation of property rights and a tendency toward concen- 
tration of the land, multazims and nazirs do not appear to have been directly 
engaged in agricultural production nor did they attempt to alter the relations of 
production. Under the right conditions, investment to raise the productivity of 
land would have been a plausible response to the era's price trends. But the 
adequately large income that many iltizims appear to have offered, and the 
possibility of losing an iltizim with a change of rulers in Cairo, probably dis- 
couraged investment. As occurred in the Balkans, the evidence so far indicates 
that increased exploitation rather than an increase in surplus production was 
the most common result of these rentiers' a c t i v i t i e ~ . ~ ~  
At the village level a variety of responses to the conditions of this century 
can also be observed. These encompass not only competition for control of the 
land, but also activities in the sphere of production which indicate a potential 
for agricultural development. At the present state of our knowledge it will have 
to suffice to present three situations illustrating these responses. 
In Giza and much of the central Delta the Mamluk beys were able to maintain 
the greatest authority, indicated by the presence of "Mamluk housesM- resi- 
dences for their local representatives - in the villages.48 These regions pro- 
duced a variety of crops for the market - cotton, flax, oilseeds, dyestuffs, and 
various food crops.49 Here, social stratification was visible at the time of the 
French occupation, the result of control of local political and economic re- 
sources. Local police and administrative offices were monopolized by the 
wealthier village families and tended to be hereditary, starting with the position 
of village shaykh. He usually represented the most powerful clan in the village 
and was the supreme police and judicial authority in the village.50 
In villages where the multazim rented out his usya land, it was leased by one 
of the village shaykhs at a price reflecting the market in land. This varied ac- 
cording to its quality and proximity to a market town: the iisya lands near Bulaq 
went at the highest rate. If the multazim had the iisya cultivated for his own 
account through wage labor or corvee, the shaykhs and khilis were responsible 
for assigning the land and were paid for their services. The khiili, an official 
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drawn from the village, was also charged with checking the survey and assess- 
ment of village lands performed by the multazim's officials - a position of con- 
siderable power and potential wealth.51 
The economic position of the wealthy families was also strengthened through 
important tax exemptions. The shaykhs, khiilis, and shuhids (local, profes- 
sional witnesses for tax purposes) were exempt from barruni taxes on portions 
of their land. These were extraordinary taxes in kind which the multazims 
levied in different villages according to their ability to impose them and the vil- 
lagers' ability to pay. Butter, sheep, cheese, grain, honey, chickens, and other 
farm products were taken, all of whose prices were increasing in absolute terms 
and drastically so in terms of the continually debased coinage. Barrani ac- 
counts appear in the tax registers from the seventeenth century on, but along 
with other taxes they increased greatly during the eighteenth.52 
The financial and political power of these families also enabled them to ac- 
quire additional lands which were kept off the tax registers with the connivance 
of other local officials.53 This was facilitated by the land system in the villages 
of Lower Egypt, since transactions also took place at this level, though legally 
only concerning usufructuary rights. In these districts, then, a wealthy peasant 
stratum in alliance with the ruling elite used its political and economic re- 
sources to acquire additional lands and tax exemptions, and were also in a posi- 
tion to rent land from absentee holders, either to produce more for the market 
or to profit from the rising price of land by subleasing. 
A quite different phenomenon was the appearance of what could be termed 
militant peasantries in certain areas. As a political-economic phenomenon, 
these peasants were protecting and sometimes extending their control over 
areas of market-oriented agriculture and commerce, as well as using their 
strength to resist the increasing burden of taxes and fees levied by the multa- 
zims and the provincial administration. As a sociological phenomenon, this de- 
velopment is associated with the sedentarization of certain bedouin tribes. 
Once they have become cultivators, bedouin are nearly indistinguishable from 
peasants - some even adopted the fallahin's brown woolen dress. Still, they 
retained a tribal identity and solidarity vis-a-vis outsiders. "Bedouin influ-
ence" seems to have been the common factor in those areas which maintained 
a quasi-independence from the beys.54 
In parts of lower Sharqiyya and Daqahliyya a sort of bedouin-fallah sym- 
biosis occurred. North of Bilbays, bedouin were described as the "caste pre- 
ponderante . . . sans ktre le plus nombreuse. . . ."55 They camped adjacent 
to fallah villages, engaging in stockbreeding and cultivation as well as in es- 
corting caravans along the route to Syria and the Hijaz. French observers de- 
scribed this region as rich in various field crops, orchards, and especially date 
groves. The peninsula of Manzala rivaled Damietta as a rice-growing region.56 
The mutual interests of the bedouin and fallahin here led to military alliances. 
"Village wars" were jointly conducted against neighboring districts, and the 
frequent mention of peasants carrying arms to the fields and of fortified towns 
and villages attest to this strife.57 Despite such conflict these reports are silent 
about any resultant "devastation." Village wars were fought for control of 
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water and land, no doubt provoked by the increasing value of land and herds 
and by occasional variations in the flood level. 
An equally important dimension of this symbiosis was the ability to resist the 
bey's exactions. Tax payments and other relations were a matter of negotiation 
between the bedouin shaykhs and the M a m l u k ~ . ~ ~  Unlike the central Delta re- 
gion, there is no mention of "Mamluk houses'' for lower Sharqiyya and Daqah- 
liyya, indicating that the beys and their subordinates could establish no perma- 
nent presence there. 
The presence of a militant peasantry in Middle Egypt also appears to be re- 
lated to the increasing importance of cash crops, but here the settled bedouin, 
"arabes cultivateurs," subjugated the fallahin and usurped their land. From 
about the middle of the century one tribe had established itself and taken up 
cultivation on the right bank of the Nile in the regions of Atfih, Ashmunin, and 
Manfaifit. At the time of Jomard's observations ( 1799- 1801) they were expand- 
ing their control of land across the river. Already they held most of the islands 
of Middle Egypt and a strip of land a quarter league wide on the left bank. The 
land seized was planted in tobacco, indigo, sugar cane, date palms, and forage 
crops, as well as melons, grains, and legumes. The first group of crops was the 
most important, grown for local and regional markets. Sugar, indigo, and wool 
were the principal industries of the villages, and these as well as dates were 
sold to Cairo merchants. Large tracts of forage crops were also planted, as 
summer cultivation required a supply of cattle to turn the waterwheels, and the 
military power and communications of these villages depended upon large 
herds of horses and camels.59 
In these and other bedouin villages of Middle and Upper Egypt the shaykhs 
acquired a preponderant political and economic role. It is primarily in these re- 
gions that small amounts of village shaykhs' masmih land appeared, land held 
by them free of any tax, said to be "vols faits par des Arabes qui sont etablis 
par force dans divers villages," and passed on to their heirs.60 This observation 
lays bare the way in which privileged landholding rights could be created at the 
village level through the exercise of local political power. The displacement of 
fallahin by bedouin in these districts is one of the most obvious forms that the 
struggle or competition for land between cultivators took. It was no less real, 
however, where wealthy peasants, here or in the Delta, acquired land through 
receiving pawns or mortgages, or through purchase of usufructuary rights -
again, aided by their command of local political and economic resources. 
In the militant peasant districts of Middle Egypt, "Mamluk houses" were 
also unknown, and at the time of the French occupation taxes were collected 
from them with difficulty or not at Here and in lower Sharqiyya the extent 
of the bey's authority versus the villagers' independence must have been fluid, 
depending on the military strength either side could marshal at any time. Title 
to the land in these areas remained in the hands of multazims and taxes were 
paid,=* although these peasants may well have escaped the full weight of the 
period's increasing taxation, which would have enabled them to benefit more 
from the secular price rise. 
In Damietta's rice-growing region, Girard's reports indicate that peasant 
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farmers were responding positively to the market opportunities of the time. 
Peasants leased land from the multazims for either a cash rent per faddan or a 
portion of the harvest, the farmer being responsible for all costs. As rice farm- 
ing required considerable working capital for waterwheels, animals and drivers 
to turn them, canal maintenance, and planting, thinning, and harvesting, the 
farmer next turned to Damietta's rice merchants for a loan at interest. After the 
harvest these merchants purchased the crop, had it milled, and placed it on the 
market. The farmer employed a permanent work force as well as seasonal mi- 
grant labor, all of whom were paid wages. Girard noted that by such arrange- 
ments, "the exploitation of the rice farms resembles more or less that of our 
farms of E ~ r o p e . " ~ T h i s   the clearest example of peasant entrepreneurship 
and development toward a capitalist organization of the relations of production 
in agriculture. 
To summarize, peasants behaved under the conditions of the times in a vari- 
ety of ways which reflected their material interests. Peasants acquired andlor 
protected their holdings through the exercise of local power, including at times 
armed force. Security of tenure may not have seemed threatened to Damietta's 
rice farmers, since predictable flood waters and the steady demand for rice 
must have ensured satisfaction of rental and credit arrangements, and must 
have made their automatic renewal relatively easy. This, at any rate, is indi- 
cated by their willingness to go heavily into debt at the beginning of each sea- 
son. In each case, peasants retained or enforced security of tenure, and suffi- 
cient freedom of action in production to take advantage of the opportunities 
offered by the rising prices of commodities and land. 
POLIT ICS  A N D  L A N D  T E N UR E :  
FROM AL I  BEY  T O  M U H AMM A D  AL I  
Both the Ottomans and their local rivals for power in Egypt confronted land- 
holding and commercial interests, and attempted to enlist their support through 
a mixture of coercion and cooption. But to the extent that these interests were 
thereby strengthened, the rulers were correspondingly weakened through loss 
of revenues and at times the loss of control of the countryside. To the extent 
that the rulers suppressed them, however, they undermined their own political 
and financial bases of support. It was a dilemma that Egypt's rulers would also 
face in the nineteenth century. 
The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries witnessed a struggle for Egypt's 
revenues on two levels. Intermediaries were largely successful in acquiring 
rights to the land, reducing the fiscal and administrative control of the state. 
Second, the contest between the w5li of Cairo and local political forces would 
determine who controlled and exploited the urban and rural tax structures. 
In the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, a number of strong wiilis 
were able to adjust state taxes to inflation, to extend them to land that had been 
concealed from the registers, and to reduce diversions of imperial revenues by 
middlemen, all of which raised state revenues for a time.64 In the period of 
Mamluk ascendancy, when strong rulers were able to establish themselves in 
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Cairo, the tendency was also to attempt to tighten control over and take a larger 
share of the lands' revenues. 
With Ali Bey al-Kabir (ruled 1760-1772,with interruptions) came the first of a 
number of attempts at political and economic centralization. Control of cus- 
toms and land-tax collection was the economic basis of his power. He inter- 
vened in the customs houses, ousting the Jewish agents and turning them over 
to Syrian merchant allies.65 As for land taxes, the treasury now received them 
as a result o f  direct negotiations between the VLli and the Seyh ul-Beled [of Cairo, de 
facto ruler o f  Egypt] o f  the time rather than by the [former] system o f  imposition and 
collection. [Assessment] and collection o f  the taxes from the cultivators was controlled 
and executed entirely by the Seyh ul-Beled and his MamlQks, who delivered to the Impe- 
rial Treasury the amounts agreed on in the negotiation^.^^ 
Ali Bey and his successors also increased the number and weight of extraordi- 
nary taxes levied in the towns and rural areas.'j7 
As efforts to establish greater central control affected land tenure, they took 
the form of replacing multazims of the opposition party with one's own follow- 
ers. Ali Bey had his rivals banished or killed, and distributed their landholdings 
among his followers, an unprecedented interference in the land regime?"he 
tightening of control over the intermediaries -while still working through them 
-was a strategy also followed in the short-lived attempts of Hasan Pasha (1786) 
and Yusuf Pasha (1801)to reassert Imperial control over the province, as it was 
in Napoleon's reorganization.'j9 Muhammad Ali followed a similar route in his 
first years as wili until the fruition of these short-term policies and new eco- 
nomic circumstances allowed and induced him to take more drastic measures. 
The pace of his reform of the land regime, part of an overall drive for central- 
ization, varied according to the balance of political forces in the country, as it 
had under his predecessors. But short-term economic and political conditions 
also pushed policy in the direction of centralization. More than two decades of 
war in Europe proved a windfall for the rulers of this food-exporting country. 
Thus Murad Bey had profited from the war of the First C ~ a l i t i o n , ~ ~  and Mu- 
hammad Ali was in a similar position when war broke out anew. Egyptian grain 
began to flow to Malta in 1808, the volume increasing two years later when the 
export price of wheat rose from 26 to 80 piasters per ardeb in less than twelve 
months under the Pasha's new monopoly. Wheat prices in Cairo at the time 
ranged from 1 2to 18piasters. In 181I the export price reached IOO piasters and 
remained high until 1813. In 1816-  1817,  due to European crop failures, the ex- 
port price of wheat rose again, during a short export boom, from 60 to I 20 pias-
ters per ardebb.71 Second, the war in Arabia required a transport fleet and 
maintenance of a large force of mercenaries, adding urgency to the search for 
new revenues. 
The boom in grain sales no doubt enabled Muhammad Ali to pursue his prep- 
arations for the Hijaz expedition more quickly, and helped finance the conclud- 
ing phases of his struggle with the Mamluk amirs. In addition to the Mamluks' 
dealings with the English, their control of the grain of Upper Egypt must have 
drawn him into putting an early end to them. The Citadel massacre followed the 
Origins of Priv~lte Ownership of Land in Egypt 257 
Mamluks' repeated violation of agreements to pay tribute - in wheat.72 Thus 
the trade boom strengthened the Pasha's hand, and along with the costs of mili- 
tary preparations accelerated his program of centralization. But major changes 
in the land regime were likely to be attempted in any event. That they were on 
the way is indicated by the gradual tightening of control over the land which 
began in 1806, and by the importance that control of the land had taken in the 
struggles of the previous century. 
As the area of Egypt under his control expanded, Muhammad Ali followed a 
policy toward land tenure which - on the surface -may appear contradictory, 
owing to the double-edged strategy of coercion and cooption. On the one hand, 
he allowed the iltiziim system to remain during his first ten years in power, 
granting iltiziims anew to his family and followers. On the other, he pursued a 
policy aimed at undermining the authority of the multazims over the fallahin, 
collecting some taxes directly from the latter, and encouraging them to voice 
their grievances against the m ~ l t a z i m s . ~ ~  The appearance of randomness in the 
land policy belies the political strategy employed. The aim was control of all the 
country's resources, but in order to accomplish this, it was necessary to piece 
together a ruling elite of family, officers, bureaucrats, and merchants, many of 
whom were placed in charge of tax farms and tracts of land under varying ar- 
rangements, including in some cases an obligation to restore uncultivated land 
to productivity. Consolidation of power also involved coming to terms with 
other political forces too powerful or  indispensable to suppress entirely - cer-
tain ulama, the village shaykhs, and certain bedouin shaykhs. Piecemeal moves 
to extend his authority reflect Muhammad Ali's understanding that any whole- 
sale changes would have encountered too much resistance. Instead, he pro- 
ceeded against the weaker targets first, temporizing when strong opposition 
was met, in order to keep a united opposition from forming. 
In 1806, half the multazims' fii'id was claimed. By 1807, masmiih lands were 
being taxed. Toward the end of the same year, Jabarti reports that lands held by 
the ulama and those under their protection were put under the regular tax. In 
1808, receiving reports that many multazims were unable to pay the sums de- 
manded, Muhammad Ali had their villages reassigned to his family and follow- 
ers. Many of these were in underpopulated Buhayra province. To correct the 
labor shortage, town dwellers bearing nisbas from that province's villages were 
forcibly relocated there.74 
In 1809, the Pasha ordered the compiling of a register for the taxation of waqf 
and iisya lands and attempted to apply it first in Buhayra. Along with new mar- 
ket taxes, this measure brought a protest from some of the ulama. On more 
than one occasion deputations were assured that the new taxes would not be 
imposed, but the persistence of the delegations indicates that some in fact may 
have been collected. Land taxes were thus selectively and unequally applied in 
this period, a legacy from the previous century and a reflection of political reali- 
ties. Jabarti records a meeting of ulama, officers, and notables convened the 
following year to consider means of improving the country's revenues. The 
shaykhs were enraged at the suggestion that their lands be taxed at a rate equal 
with that of the others. Yet shortly thereafter, registers were drawn up to in- 
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clude all land for taxation, including usya, waqf, and land held by the village 
shaykhs untaxed until then.75 
After 1810the reorganization of the land regime and agriculture entered a 
more intensive phase. Even before this time, multazims had faced extreme 
pressure to meet their tax obligations on time, even if it meant paying out of 
their pockets or borrowing at interest. If a multazim was unable to meet his 
obligations he had to surrender the land without being freed of his debt. In 
1812,with the conquest of Upper Egypt, nearly all lands there were seized by 
the state and taxed directly. Waqf lands attached to mosques were taxed at half 
rate. These taxes were taken in kind, and wheat was already being accepted in 
place of cash payments in other parts of the country. Wheat not taken in taxa- 
tion was subject to a state monopoly. Rice was monopolized from 1812.The 
rice-producing lands were put under the supervision of salaried officials who 
took the place of merchants in advancing capital to the peasants and purchasing 
their harvests.76 
The cadastral survey of Lower Egypt, 1813-1814,was the culmination of 
this phase of centralization. All cultivated and uncultivated land was surveyed. 
Land was recorded in the names of its holders, or cultivators, or those indi- 
cated as tenants at the time - that is, the names of all with a claim to the land 
were r e g i ~ t e r e d . ~ ~  The surveyors used a standard faddan reportedly smaller 
than most customary ones which ranged in size from 200 to 400 square qusabas 
(a linear measure originally taken from a sugar cane); the new faddan equaled 
333 ' 1 3  qasabas. Land was classified according to its fertility and a correspond- 
ing scale of taxation set.78 At the cadaster's completion, most intermediary 
landholders were to be dispossessed for a promised pension. 
The organization of a pyramidal administration was completed along with the 
cadaster and the land confiscations. All officials above the village level were 
salaried. They were charged with public security, maintenance of the irrigation 
system, and supervision of cultivation - including the allocation of seeds, im- 
plements, and animals as needed - as well as collection of taxes, and the pur- 
chase of crops subject to state m o n o p o l i e ~ . ~ ~  Taxes were unified but not neces- 
sarily reduced, and the old intermediate structure, already partly bypassed, 
was eliminated. 
During 1814the multazims were allowed to collect the harvest on their usya 
lands, although they found that the peasants had heard of the confiscations and 
now resisted the corvee. The bureau charged with reviewing ahli waqfs re- 
quired their holders to present their deeds with supporting statements. Those 
with titles verified after the Ottoman reconquest of 1801were to be taxed at half 
rate. Waqfs assigned to charitable works were incorporated into village lands 
and taxed a c c ~ r d i n g l y . ~~  The rigorous procedure of verification no doubt was 
designed to bring the maximum amount of land under government control. 
It appears that many of Muhammad Ali's mercenaries and their wives had 
acquired iltiziims by 1815.Their confiscation that year, and an attempt to intro- 
duce European-style drill, caused several units in Cairo to mutiny and to riot. 
As one result, many of these multazims were allowed to retain their iisya lands, 
but without any of the old rights to corvee labor to farm them.*l These and 
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other multazims were promised a pension in compensation for their lost lands, 
but it was smaller than expected and slow in coming. Usya lands were to be tax 
free, yet Amin Sami's account of the 181711818 budget shows these being taxed 
at the full rate. Finally, in the case of all lands retained by the old interme- 
diaries, they found that their holdings had shrunk due to the new, smaller fed- 
dan employed in the survey.82 
Helen Rivlin has noted the similarity of Muhammad Ali's reorganization to 
previous plans for reform. "The revolution in Egyptian land tenure, envisioned 
in part by Selim 111, Napoleon, and Menou," she writes, "had been executed 
by Muhammad Ali. . . ."""n fact, this was more a resurrection of the Otto- 
man land system originally established in Egypt. That system had also been de- 
signed to maximize the flow of revenue to the capital. It had also consisted of 
an administrative structure of salaried officials who collected taxes and over- 
saw irrigation and c ~ l t i v a t i o n . ~~  Ottoman attempts to reverse the process of 
loosening central control in various provinces during the seventeenth and eigh- 
teenth centuries had aimed at curtailing if not abolishing tax farming, to return 
to something like the original system. But the Ottomans lacked the strength to 
carry this reform through. Instead they were forced to seek the support of the 
same elements who had usurped state authority over the land, in their efforts to 
suppress the Mamluk beys. Only vestiges of the original Ottoman land system 
survived in Egypt by the late eighteenth century, but the scribes who collabo- 
rated with the French undoubtedly drew inspiration from that system in 
helping the French devise their "new" system. 
Muhammad Ali's administrative centralization was revolutionary in that it 
completely altered the structure of political power in Egypt. The notion that in 
its methods it was something fundamentally new or European-inspired, how- 
ever, should be discarded. It was but a phase in the recurring pattern of a cen- 
tral authority's struggle with local rivals for control of the land revenues of the 
country. 
Agrarian policy under Muhammad Ali was part of a program of economic 
expansion in all spheres. At the same time, financial straits resulting from cam- 
paigns, diplomatic crises, and fluctuations in international markets added to the 
pressure on the agricultural sector, always the chief source of revenues. 
The relationship of state commerce and industry to agriculture cannot be 
overemphasized. Muhammad Ali's tightening of control over the land followed 
and complimented his control of commerce. He acquired control of Cairo's 
customs in I 805, and the Mediterranean ports' customs in I 807, with the addition 
of these cities to his domain. The development of the state as a commercial 
enterprise is symbolized by the career of Boghos Yusufian of Izmir, a member 
of one of the era's far-flung Armenian merchant families. In Muhammad Ali's 
service he rose from merchant and farmer of Alexandria's customs to "minis- 
ter'' of commerce and foreign affairs by the mid 182os, in step with the develop- 
ment of Egyptian state admin i~ t r a t i on .~~  
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The Pasha himself brought to Egypt a considerable knowledge of the eastern 
Mediterranean's commerce and politics. As one who combined the roles of sol- 
dier and merchant in Cavalla, Macedonia, he was typical of his times.86 Once in 
control of Egypt, he set about organizing state and parastatal commerce as op- 
portunity permitted. Egypt's Mediterranean fleet was from the beginning a 
merchant fleet, the acquisition of large warships dating from the Greek revolt of 
1821.87 By patronizing a group of Armenian, Greek, Syrian, Maghribi, and local 
merchants, Muhammad Ali received important financial services, and tied into 
a network of commercial and diplomatic intelligence." Before "modern" state 
banking and diplomatic structures appeared, then, their functions were being 
performed by such associates. The flow of information permitted the Pasha to 
manipulate exports and export prices to his advantage, and to devise policies- 
including agrarian policies - in light of international conditions. 
Nonmilitary industrial projects were undertaken with just such knowledge of 
past and contemporary economic trends. State efforts to develop Egypt's tex- 
tile industries led to ,the introduction of sericulture and the expansion of cotton 
and indigo production. This entailed the deepening of old canals and the digging 
of new ones for summer irrigation, even before the discovery of "Jumel" long-
fiber cotton. According to Mustafa Fahmy's figures, of the total cotton-proc- 
essing capacity installed (not accounting for replacement), 49 percent of the 
cards, 22 percent of the mule jennies, and 57 percent of Egypt's looms were set 
up in 1817- 1821. Five of nine bleaching works and the only two printing works 
were also established before 1821, the first year of Jumel p r o d u ~ t i o n . ~ ~  All of 
this indicates an early intent to modernize and expand cotton textile produc- 
tion. 
Food crops and other traditional crops such as flax and oil seeds remained 
important for internal consumption, industry, and export. In addition, large 
new tracts of olives and vines were planted, opium culture was revived, and 
merino sheep were imported to supply a new woolen industry. Skilled 
foreigners were employed to establish or  improve the production of silk, in- 
digo, and opium.g0 Land was granted tax free, as rizyu bi-lu mu/,  to those who 
would plant either acacia trees or horticultural gardens along the new Mahmu- 
diyya Canal. Acacias produced a hardwood used in construction. Tax exemp- 
tions on date palms were similarly intended to encourage their cultivation. Ex- 
periments were also made in acclimatizing coffee, cochineal, and teak, but 
were di~appointing.~'  
A variety of sources contain estimates and official accounts of the area of land 
under cultivation, or taxed, in this period. Most reliable accounts for the period 
1800-1850 indicate that the total cultivated area was between 3 and 4 million 
faddans (see table I) .  All evidence points to increasing areas of land culti- 
vated during this period. Three projects which extended the area of cultivation 
were completed by 1820: the Mahmudiyya Canal, running from the Rosetta 
branch of the Nile to Alexandria, the repair of the sea dike near Alexandria, 
and the reclamation of the Wadi Tumaylat for sericulture, which alone involved 
the construction of I ,000 saqiyas waterwheel^).^^ 
How did the agrarian and land tenure systems evolve in this period? Once the 
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TABLE  I Accounts of Egypt's cultivated and taxed land, 1880-1952~ 
Taxed 
Lower Egypt Upper Egypt Total "Cultivated" "Cultivable" 
a 	In 1,000s of faddans. Cf. Patrick O'Brien, "The Long-Term Growth of Agricultural Production 
in Egypt," in P. M. Holt, ed., Politicaland SocialChange in Modern Egypt (Oxford, 1968), p. 172, 
table. 
Sources: 
1800: Pierre Jacotin, "Tableau de la superficie de I'Egypt," Description de I'Egypte, Erat 
moderne, XVIII, 2, pp. 102-105. Note that by Jacotin's method, his figures are subject to a large 
degree of error, after any inaccuracies in the preparation of the French maps of Egypt. The figures 
used here have been modified by Helen Rivlin to equal "new" faddans (The Agricultural Policy of  
Muhammad Ali in Egypt [Cambridge, Mass., 19611, p. 265). 
1813 ( I ) :  Omar Toussoun, Lri Gkographie de I'Egypte ir I' ipoque Arabe, Memoires de la Societe 
Royale de Geographie d'Egypte, VIII, 3 (Cairo, 1928), p. 508. 
1813 (2): Yacoub Artin, La PropriPti fonciPre en Egypte (Cairo, 1883), p. 325. 
1813 (3): Idem, "Essai sur les causes de rencherissement de la vie materielle au Caire dans le 
courant du XlXe siecle," Memoires presentees a I'lnstitut Egyptien, V, 2 (Cairo, 1907), 67. 
181511816: Ali Barakat, Tatawwur al-Milkiyya 01-Zira'iyya fiMisr wa Atharuh 'old 01-Haraka 
a/-Siydsiyya 1813-1914 (Cairo, 1977). pp. 26-28. See also n. 103. 
181711818: Sami, Taqwim al-Nil,  11, 266-270. 
18~011821:Barakat, Tafawwur a/-Milkiyya, pp. 26-28. 
1822: Sami, Taqn,im 01-Nil, 11, 298-302. The increase for Upper Egypt is due at least in part to 
the extension of the land tax to areas where previously only trees and water lifting devices were 
taxed. 
1835: John Bowring, "Report on Egypt and Candia," Parliamentary Papers 1840, XXI, as cited 
in O'Brien, "Long-Term Growth of Agricultural Production," p. 172. 
1830s: A. B. Clot, Apercu gPnPral sur I'Egypte (2 vols.; Paris, 1840), 11, 264-265. 
1840: Artin, "Essai," p. 68. 
1843: de Regny, Statistique de I'Egypte (Alexandria, 1870), as cited in O'Brien, "Long-Term 
Growth of Agricultural Production," p. 172. 
1852: Butros Ghali, "Rapport presente a la commission d'enqukte de I'impbt foncier en 1880," 
cited in Artin, "Essai," p. 68, for the area taxed. The area cultivated is Artin's own figure. 
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cadaster of 1813-1814 had been completed, and with a pattern of extensive 
state involvement in commerce and industry taking shape, pivotal changes in 
the agrarian regime were a short and complimentary step. In 1816, state mo- 
nopolies were extended: the fallahin were forbidden to sell their harvests of 
hemp, sesame, indigo, cotton, wheat, beans, and barley to anyone but govern- 
ment agents. These were taken to government warehouses in each village, 
bought at a fixed price, and credited to each peasant's account after deductions 
of taxes. The rice monopoly continued along the lines previously set.g" 
That year the state also entered directly into production - planting and culti- 
vation - as evidenced by an order to the mudirs to see to the doubling of the 
area devoted to hemp, chick-peas, sesame, and cotton, although the order was 
unevenly enforced. Scribes were charged with keeping track of crops on the 
stalk, and were to follow them through each stage of cultivation - not because 
the fallahin needed instruction but to thwart the thievery which was their re- 
sponse to the new controls. This system was continued through the late 1830s, 
although the internal trade in grain was freed in 1 8 3 0 . ~ ~  
Land tenure in this period took several forms, with different motives and 
consequences. State policy was influenced by a desire to increase production, 
to take from it the maximum surplus possible, but also to insure the loyalty of 
bureaucratic and military cadres. It was not Muhammad Ali's policy to reward 
his followers' services with land: ". . . j'en ai trouve le moyen en leur pro- 
diguant l'argent et les presents, mais en les empkchant de devenir proprietaires 
et de se creer eux-mCmes une influence personelle sur la pop~ l a t i on . "~~  
Yet a certain amount of land was alienated. The contradictory aspect of land 
grants to individuals in a period of increased central control of the land again 
highlights the compromises necessary to offset opposition to the new order and 
to attach indispensable elements to it. And the state could confidently grant 
limited amounts of land as long as it was capable of dictating the terms of land 
tenure. This, of course, in no way contradicts the thesis that many grants in this 
period were also aimed at encouraging agricultural investment, experimenta- 
tion, and land reclamation. 
Grants of rizqa bi-15 mril were offered from 1827. Much of the area along the 
Mahmudiyya Canal had lost population, and cultivation there had declined dur- 
ing the previous century. The capital required to set up waterwheels and plant 
trees means that these grants must have gone to wealthier individuals. 
Uncultivated land, surveyed in the cadasters but not included in the tax reg- 
isters (hence the term ih'udiyya, "set apart") was granted under two different 
sets of circumstances. One type was granted to individuals who would bring 
them into production. They were given a deed entitling them to lifetime tenure, 
although the land was to revert to the state upon their death. The first such 
grant occurred in 1826: they appear to have been granted both as tax exempt for 
life and tax exempt for the first few years. They were undertaken by officials, 
officers, and foreigners, the latter forfeiting any capitulatory privileges. By 
1837, these lands came to 103,175 faddans, and by 1848, to 164,960 faddans, 
nearly exclusively in Middle Egypt. In the registers inspected by Ali Barakat, 
nearly all recipients of these grants occupied high administrative or military po- 
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~ i t i o n s . ~ ~A small amount of cultivated, ma'mur, land was also granted: 8,703 
feddans between 1827 and 1 8 4 8 . ~ ~  
Bedouin pastoralists were also granted lands classified as ib'fidiyya, as an in- 
ducement to settling, on condition that they cultivate them. But these tribes 
often found it more convenient to sublet to tenants. Decrees in 1837, 1846, and 
later prohibited this practice. Bedouin ib'fidiyya grants involved no title deed, 
but only the Pasha's promise not to tax the bedouin directly, nor to subject 
them to corvee or c on s~ r i p t i on . ~~  By such arrangements these grants appear to 
have been a kind of treaty: in return for their special status, bedouin served as 
auxiliaries in the army. Their revolt and migration were provoked by Abbas's 
and Said's efforts to tax their lands in the 1 8 5 0 s . ~ ~  
Personal estates held by members of the ruling family came to be called jifliks 
(~iftliks). Their extent in this period is unknown, but it was probably limited 
due to the alienation of revenues involved. Contemporary sources mention es- 
tates held by Muhammad Ali, for example, at Shubra, Ibrahim's estate on Rtida 
Island, and others.loO These early estates do not appear in the registers of ji- 
fliks, all dating from 1838, which Barakat examined (discussed in the following 
section). In the case of the early personal estates and the new jifliks granted 
from 1838, the principle of land given a member of the ruling family is the same. 
But the later grants were part of a strategy of continuing state control of agricul- 
ture in the wake of the Treaty of Balta Liman the same year. The different cir- 
cumstances and intent of the new jifliks account for the separate registers. 
While Muhammad Ali's reorganization had established a salaried bureau- 
cracy in the countryside, state administration at the village level continued to 
be carried out by prominent villagers much as it had under the old regime. Vil- 
lage shaykhs were appointed from among the wealthier families as before. Not 
a few such families must have held the office under the beys.lol Under Muham- 
mad Ali, the village shaykhs received grants of tax-free land, masmiih, in lieu of 
salaries. Grants of masmiih were made in Upper Egypt as early as 1813.1°2 The 
cadaster of Lower Egypt was not completed until 1814, and whether masmiih 
lands were granted there at the time is uncertain. Jabarti first mentions masmiih 
in reference to the cadaster of I 820- I 82I .lo" 
Two types of masmiih were granted, masmuh ul-masheikh and masmuh 
al-mastuba. The former was intended as compensation for official duties ex- 
plained below. The latter, sometimes assigned to the same individual, was to 
support the costs of visitors' and officials' lodging and board. Most shaykhs 
received four to five faddans of land as masmiih out of every 105 faddans of 
ma'mur land belonging to the village. The most prominent shaykhs, or muqad- 
dims, received 10faddans out of every IOO faddans of ma'miir in the village.lo4 
Differing local conditions and the different periodicity and modes of fiscal and 
administrative reorganization, however, preclude an assumption of complete 
uniformity in this system's application. The quality of the masmiih lands the 
shaykhs received, andlor their activities in improving them, caused these lands 
to be assessed at the highest rates in the villages when Said taxed them in 
1857.1°5 
In addition to their acquisition of these lands, the shaykhs, their families and 
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proteges continued to be in a position to amass wealth and accumulate addi- 
tional land, despite the more stringent supervision of land registration and ex- 
ploitation than before. With the increased involvement of the state in produc- 
tion, the shaykhs' power increased. They were made responsible for assessing 
and collecting taxes (as in the past), for reassigning athar land on a fallah's 
death or conscription, for apportioning corvee duty, and for assigning the culti- 
vation of cash crops among the fallahin once the quota to be grown had been 
fixed.lo6 The shaykhs' abuse of their role in reassigning lands is said to have led 
Said to transfer this function to the provincial governments in 1854.1°7 It was 
these families, the wealthy peasantry, whose members were recruited when the 
lower provincial offices were opened to native Egyptians in the 1 8 3 0 s . ~ ~ ~  Ha-
mont reports that one such official who rose in the provincial administration of 
Tanta held some 500 to 600 faddans of ib'fidiyya land in 1839. It was found that 
300 faddans of this land had been "stolen" from one of Abbas Pasha's jifliks 
several years earlier.log Whether a victim of political intrigue, a real villain, or 
both, this fallah's career indicates the scale of wealth that a few of the rural elite 
could reach. 
In 1837, noting that there were many landless fallahin in the villages who 
worked as day laborers, Duhamel observed that ". . .il n'est pas rare de 
trouver des Sceiks, qui possedent. . .mille et plus de feddans. . . ." of athar 
land.l1° This was an exaggeration in terms of the typical amount of land held, 
but further testifies to the existence of a distinct stratum of wealthy peasants 
which, despite the changes in the land regime, was able to maintain and even 
improve its position. 
How did the condition of the peasantry change in this period? To say that 
under the Mamluk beys the peasants were sheltered from direct contact with 
the state, implying that this made life easier for them,"' is to misunderstand the 
nature of the old and new regimes. Both exploited the peasantry. Under both a 
peasant family's ability to withstand the burdens imposed and/or to shift them 
onto others' shoulders was a matter of relative strength. The weak, poor, and 
unprotected fared the worst in face of the state and the rural elite in both peri- 
ods. One rough indicator of overall conditions in this period is an upturn in pop- 
ulation. "Civil order," in the opinion of a recent writer, accounts for lowered 
mortality.l12 On the other hand, the gains made by wealthy peasants could only 
have come at their poorer neighbors' expense. In addition, peasants were ex- 
propriated in the creation of large estates in the 1840s, and reduced there to 
wage laborers and tenants. 
The new regime did affect the fallah's life more directly in many ways, with 
the introduction of conscription, the organization of corvee labor for distant 
projects, the relocation of population on reclaimed land, and the control of agri- 
culture and village industries. Taxation increased and was more effectively en- 
forced. But these new demands did not go without resistance. The later years 
of Jabarti's chronicle contain references to black marketing and strenuous ef- 
forts to suppress it.l13 Resistance to increasing demands on the populace took 
the form of indifferent work or sabotage in factories and on the farms, and self- 
mutilization, endemic stealing, or outright revolt.l14 
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Revolt occurs less from absolutely intolerable conditions than from condi- 
tions perceived to be intolerable -that is, one's condition and response to it are 
matters of subjective appraisal. Adequately fed peasants who have recently im- 
proved their lot or have something to gain are more likely to revolt than those 
who are completely ground down.l15 The great peasant revolts of Upper Egypt 
and the one in Sharqiyya occurred in areas which had enjoyed a quasi-auton- 
omy a generation earlier. These revolts followed the more thorough cadaster of 
1820- 1821 and an increase in rural taxation, and were set off by the beginning 
of conscription. 
T H E  GROWTH  A N D  ENTRENCHMENT  O F  PR IV ILEGED  
LANDHOLD INGS  FROM 1838 
The landholding system as it developed between the first cadaster and the 
late 1830s was not uniform in regard to the principle of ownership, but rather it 
reflected the priorities of the state: to increase production, both to fuel the 
economy and provide revenues, and to provide for and conciliate certain ele- 
ments indispensable to maintaining the state. The bulk of village lands were 
taxed and administered directly through the bureaucracy in cooperation with 
prominent village families. Exempt from taxation were the masmuh lands in the 
hands of the shaykhs, bedouin ib'adiyya grants, rizqa bi-15 ma1 and ib'adiyya 
grants belonging to officers, officials, and other wealthy individuals, and the 
personal estates of royal family members and a few high officers and officials. 
As long as the state created by Muhammad Ali remained strong it could resist 
any pressure to remove these lands from its ultimate control. Once created, 
however, the new bureaucratic machinery was potentially at the disposal of 
landed interests, should they gain control over it. 
The changes in Egypt's land regime during Muhammad Ali's final decade re- 
flect the weakening of the state due to the defeat in Syria (1840) and the imposi- 
tion of free trade according to the provisions of the Treaty of Balta Liman 
(1838). The state had also been weakened by a fiscal crisis. 
The increasing demands of capital investment, a growing military establish- 
ment and constant wars, along with a far from perfect bureaucracy, epidemics, 
and a capricious Nile, had caused many villages to fall into tax arrears by this 
time.l16 Agriculture and the land tax accounted for the lion's share of revenue 
and had to be maintained. At first, a short-lived attempt was made to merge the 
responsibilities of villages in arrears with those still able to meet their obliga- 
tions.l17 Finally in 1840, a decree was issued which in essence resurrected the 
iltizam system of old, in the form of 'uhda grants: high officers, officials, and 
family members were required to take over responsibility for the bankrupt vil- 
lages, paying the arrears, and collecting and forwarding each year's taxes 
thereafter. They were charged with providing working capital as needed by the 
fallahin, with supervising cultivation and harvesting, and were to act as local 
arbiters, replacing the middle level of state bureaucracy in these capacities. 
The creation of the 'uhdas accomplished a forced contribution from the 
wealthy with the payment of the arrears, and was designed to insure future rev- 
enues, while at the same time cutting administrative costs. Peasants on the 
'uhdas were also thereby relieved of the accumulation of tax arrears. The recip- 
ients of these grants, the mutu'uhhids, received a section of land in each 'uhda 
to cultivate for their own profit.lIs 
Following the Treaty of Balta Liman and the defeat in Syria, an acceleration 
of jiflik grants also took place, and these are said to have included the best cot- 
ton lands in the c o ~ n t r y . " ~  Muhammad Ali himself acquired most of these, 
239,426 of a total of 334,216 faddans granted between 1838 and 1846. Nearly all 
the new jifliks created were in Lower Egypt.Iz0 Administration of the new jifliks 
was patterned after the bureaucratic regime previously established over the en- 
tire country, and all peasants on these estates were reduced to tenancy or wage 
labor.I2l 
Both the 'uhdas and new jifliks enabled Muhammad Ali to circumvent the 
intent of Balta Liman tariffs, which would henceforth prevent use of the cus- 
toms to control the import-export trade, or the use of trade monopolies to ma- 
nipulate commodity prices. Now that these options were closed, the Pasha re- 
treated into the sphere of production in order to maintain the monopoly of 
commodities in a new form. As evidence of this he acquired by far the largest 
amount of his new jifliks in 1841 -1845, only one jiflik grant in this period going 
to someone else.122 
Peasants on 'uhdas also were expropriated. The muta'ahhids were required 
to take over athar lands which destitute peasants lacked the means to cultivate, 
with the stipulation that as their condition improved these peasants would re- 
gain direct responsibility for their lands step by step.123 It appears in fact that 
little effort was made to improve the fallahin's lot. The pressure on muta'ahhids 
to meet tax payments worked against this in any event, and many fallahin on 
these estates found themselves reduced to tenancy. Barakat found that of the 
'uhdas held by the royal family in 1846- 1847, only 99,301 of a total of 228,461 
feddans were recorded as remaining in peasant hands.'24 
The apparent lack of resistance to these changes in their status may reflect 
the truly desperate straits of peasants on 'uhda and jiflik lands, in which relief 
from tax arrears and a continued guaranteed livelihood as tenants and laborers 
would seem to them an improvement. But this rather tranquil picture may also 
reflect the inadequacy of our sources in showing the peasants' response. 
In addition to the obvious fiscal motivations, the pattern of land grants in the 
1840s may also reflect court factionalism, which became more pronounced, and 
a desire to attach the political elite more firmly to the Pasha, in light of this 
division. New jiflik grants are recorded for the Pasha's two daughters, a 
nephew, sons Said and Halim, and grandson Abbas, but none for Tbrahim.lZ5 
While the aim of encouraging investment was never absent from policy ,Iz6 the 
extension of ib'iidiyya holders' rights may also have been a political concession 
to them. These lands had been made inheritable in 1836; in 1842, full rights of 
disposition over them were granted.lZ7 
Aside from ib'iidiyya lands and the new jifliks, further forfeiture of control of 
the land was avoided. No rights of disposal were given the muta'ahhids. The 
law of 1846 codified some of the fallahin's traditional rights over their land -
including its transfer - and may have been intended in part as a counterpoise to 
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the muta'ahhid's power. By reaffirming the fallah's right to return to athar land 
he had abandoned it appears designed to lure back fugitives, and it dovetails 
with the intent that destitute peasants were to take back land taken over by the 
muta'ahhids as soon as they were able.lZ8 
This blend of old and new arrangements indicates that while the administra- 
tion of land tenure was adjusted to meet new exigencies, the aims of policy re- 
mained essentially as  before: maximization of production and revenue with 
tight state control over the land. Although the genesis of the land regime of the 
next generation -with its large estates - is apparent here, such was not the in- 
tent. If the state had been able to maintain its policies and to regain sufficient 
authority over the landholders it had created, then landholding in Egypt after 
mid-century would have evolved differently from the way in which it actually 
did. 
UNRESOLVED  CONTRADICTIONS  
The further legislation of formal landownership rights in nineteenth-century 
Egypt resulted not only from the tendency of larger landholders to take and ask 
for more, but also from rulers' efforts to resolve a basic contradiction in the 
very process of state formation. It was the same dilemma faced earlier by Otto- 
man reformers and their local rivals in Cairo. Maximization of revenue was the 
sine qua non of building and maintaining a strong state, whether one considers 
Ottoman policy or the efforts of local strongmen attempting to build successor 
states. This requirement lies behind the variety of fiscal reform schemes the 
period witnessed, and it tended to push policy in the direction of administrative 
centralization, the elimination of tax-farming middlemen, and tighter, more di- 
rect control of the land. The same principle applied to commerce, as expressed 
in state policy in regard to appaltos and tax farms of the customs. Thus admin- 
istrative and fiscal reform went hand in hand with "military reform," the crea- 
tion of forces capable of dominating the countryside and of eliminating inde- 
pendent focuses of power. 
On the other hand, the process of reviving a state or of building one anew 
also required the collaboration of indispensable elements in the society: village 
shaykhs, merchants, bureaucrats, officers, and so on, many if not all of whom 
held lands andlor tax-farming offices. To the extent that the state had to rely on 
their support it could not afford to confiscate or tighten control over their land- 
holdings, mercantile activities, or offices - at least not without significant con- 
cessions and exemptions. But to the extent that revenues were needed, the 
ruler was drawn in this direction, into direct confrontation with landed interests 
in particular. 
Egypt's rulers sought to resolve this dilemma in two ways. One was to estab- 
lish military dominance in the countryside, and then to allow supporters and 
collaborators to establish themselves, or remain, as landlords. But this strategy 
simply reproduced the contradiction in a new form, postponing its resolution. 
Thus under Ali Bey and his successors, and in Muhammad Ali's early years, 
such a policy was accompanied by increased tax pressure on the landholders. 
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Similarly, we read of the seemingly erratic behavior of rulers who alternately 
"favored" a merchant group and subjected them to degrees of extortion.129 
The second way out was military expansion. It is not proposed here that this 
is the only factor behind expansion. But successful conquest might help fill the 
state's coffers in the short run through booty, and in the long run through con- 
trol of trade routes and the exploitation of imperial possessions, the latter re- 
lieving - at least temporarily - the pressure to raise greater revenues at home. 
The role of different rulers' merchant allies in Egypt's expansion thus deserves 
attention. They knew the regions worth conquering and exploiting, they pos- 
sessed the expertise with which to milk them, and they had an interest in reliev- 
ing pressure on themselves at home and in trading in conquered territories 
under state patronage.I3O Expansion also involved - and could pay for - an ex- 
panded military, which would enhance the ruler's ability to apply coercion at 
home. 
Conquest, however, was a risky affair. The returns were potentially great, 
but only if conquered territory could be held and administered without major 
cost. 
Thus the Powers' intervention in 1840 to confine Muhammad Ali's forces to 
Egypt takes on an added dimension of importance. This event has been seen as 
confirming the region's movement along the road to economic dependence and 
underdevelopment. The substantial truth of this proposition, should not, how- 
ever, be allowed to obscure the importance of sociopolitical processes within 
Egypt which reinforced this trend. Efforts to retain control of the land and ob- 
struct free trade after 1840 indicate that Egypt's rulers had not given up the 
game. Administrative reform, education, exploration for minerals, and the irri- 
gation works - that is, the creation of a modern state -continued under Abbas 
and Said. As before, such activities were intended to meet the requirements of 
contemporary conditions and were subject to the shifting strength of the rulers 
and different political factions. Both Abbas and Said sought to consolidate their 
positions, to increase the state's control of the land, and to raise revenues. 
Reminiscent of Muhammad Ali, Abbas confiscated from two-thirds to three- 
quarters of the 'uhdas for nonpayment of taxes, and attempted to tax bedouin 
ib'adiyya lands. He was also accused of attempting to recreate Muhammad 
Ali's monopolies.131 
Yet by the late 1840s the state had lost its ability to milk commerce through 
the customs, its army had been reduced, and future military expansion was 
ruled out except in the direction of Africa. Such constraints limited the inde- 
pendent maneuverability of Egypt's rulers and enhanced the relative power of 
indigenous political interests, as reflected in the ovbious use of land grants for 
political ~ a t r 0 n a g e . I ~ ~  These groups in turn sought to consolidate their positions 
as landholders, from members of the ruling family and high officials at the top 
to the rural elite which increasingly rose in the middle levels of the bureau- 
cracy. The value attached to land increased, especially in the 1850s, the result 
of the irrigation works and rising export prices for cotton and grain.133 As one 
indication of the wealthy landholders' increased leverage on the state, the right 
of fallahin to return to athar land they had abandoned was reduced step by step 
in this decade. Furthermore, the fallahin's abandonment of land to the state for 
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sale to investors was fa~i1 i ta ted . l~~ Both measures were a signficant reversal of 
traditional state policy which hastened the concentration of land in fewer 
hands. 
Among all groups able to influence state policy, there was a direct interest in 
free trade and a more liberal definition of landholders' rights. Indeed, as Baer 
writes, there was "a need . . . felt to facilitate land transactions," but not, as 
he states, simply "to encourage the development of agr i~ul ture ." '~~  A century 
earlier, de facto rights of ownership had appeared in usage, the result of the 
ipcreased value attached to land in a situation where the state was unable to 
maintain effective control over its disposition. Agricultural development inten- 
sified in the nineteenth century, but in a situation where the state's authority 
had considerably increased and where many of the larger landholders them- 
selves were high state officials. Thus the arena where the struggle for land was 
played out shifted to the state, and its results were expressed in legislation. 
New fiscal needs, large tracts of land alienated by earlier grants, and the con- 
tinued concealment of athar land from the tax registers led Said to take the 
well-known measures of the 1850s, which had the effect of further defining and 
strengthening landholders' rights. He imposed a mild tax, the 'ushur, on jilflik, 
ib'iidiyya, and on the remaining 'uhda lands, but at the price of granting full 
ownership rights to their h01ders.l~~ He succeeded in subjecting bedouin 
ib'iidiyya lands to the much higher k h a r ~ jtax, which required a series of expe- 
ditions to coerce the tribes. Masmiih lands were subjected to the khariij in 1857 
and assimilated to village lands in 1858. But the shaykhs retained most of their 
local prerogatives, including the duty to assess lands for taxation138 - that is, 
they remained able to protect what they held and acquire more - while tradi- 
tional rights of disposition over peasant lands were confirmed but not extended 
to absolute private ownership. 
The legislation of 1854- 1858 reflects the ascendancy, once again, of landed 
classes in Egypt, able to influence land-tenure policy in their own interests. 
These classes were to prove more powerful and enduring than their counter- 
parts of the eighteenth century. They were able to prosper, the more powerful 
gaining formal ownership rights over large estates in exchange for extremely 
low rates of t a ~ a t i 0 n . l ~ ~  This, and Egypt's lack of control over customs rates, 
meant that the full weight of the state's increasing fiscal needs was born by the 
small peasantry. Despite the increased exploitation of the peasantry, state ex- 
penditures outstripped revenues. Said and Ismail were obliged to look outside 
of Egypt for financing, to the point of heavy borrowing and eventual 
bankruptcy. 
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